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AN ALTERNATIVE MATHEMATICAL DESCRIPTION 
OF A PLAYER IN GAME: THEORY 
Jean-Pierre Aubin 
INTRODUCTION 
In standard game theory and mathematical economics, an actor 
or player is usually represented by a utility function - or, more 
generally, by a preference preordering. We propose here a new 
mathematical description of a player which incorporates several 
features drawn from cognitive psychology. Two key factors are 
introduced: the environment on which the player acts, and a dy- 
namic (temporal) element. Viability theory is used to add some 
mathematical flesh to this conceptual skeleton. 
We begin by describing a player as a cognitive system, spec- 
ifying its unknowns and the associated laws of evolution; we then 
attempt to justify this approach. The discussion concludes with 
a mathematical description of a player and a presentation of an 
analog of a standard noncooperative game based on our new approach. 
THE COGNITIVE SYSTEM 
The unknowns of the cognitive system are described by its 
state (sensory-motor couple) and a regulatory control (conceptual 
control). The state of the system (henceforth called the sensory- 
motor state) is described by: 
1. The state of the environment on which the player acts. 
2. The state of cerebral motor activity of the player, which 
guides his action on the environment. 
The regulatory control of the cognitive system is described by: 
3. An endogenous cerebral activity which is not genetically 
programmed, but acquired by learning and recorded in the 
memory. The purpose of this activity is to "interpret" 
(or " illuminate" ) the sensory perception of the environment, 
and we shall call it the " c o n c e p t u a l  c o n t r o l " .  
We should emphasize that we shall study the e v o l u t i o n  both of 
the state of the cognitive system and of its regulatory control. 
For this purpose, we must identify the laws that govern the 
evolution of the system. These are as follows: 
1 .  A r e c o g n i t i o n  mech a n i sm ,  with genetically programmed evolu- 
tion, which matches the conceptual control to be chosen with the 
sensory perception of the environment and of variations in the 
environment. 
2 .  A law f o r  e v o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t :  - the velocity of 
this evolution depends upon the evolutionary history of both the 
environment and the cerebral motor activity. 
3 .  A law f o r  e v o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  c e r e b r a l  mo t or  a c t i v i t y :  - the 
velocity of this evolution depends upon the evolutionary history 
of both the sensory perception of the environment and the con- 
ceptual control (this law is used as a regulatory mechanism). 
4 .  A v i a b i l i t y  c o n d i t i o n ,  which expresses the fact that at 
each instant the player t r a n s f o r m s  the environment by acting upon 
it and consuming scarce resources. 
Applying viability theory to this system leads to a nondeterm- 
inistic feedback map associating a set of conceptual controls 
(possibly empty) with each sensory-motor couple. This map is 
determined by the four laws outlined above. Viability theory 
states that, under certain technical conditions described at the 
end of this paper, a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
e x i s t e n c e  of a  s o l u t i o n  ( s t a t e - c o n t r o l )  t o  t h e  c o g n i t i v e  system 
i s  t h a t  t h e  sets of conceptua l  c o n t r o l s  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  every 
sensory-motor couple  by t h e  feedback map a r e  nonempty. Fur ther -  
more, it s t a t e s  t h a t  f o r  every s o l u t i o n  of t h e  c o g n i t i v e  system, 
t h e  conceptua l  c o n t r o l s  depend upon t h e  sensory-motor couples  
through t h i s  feedback law. The feedback map can t h e r e f o r e  be 
regarded a s  t h e  learning process of t h e  p l a y e r .  
COMMENTS 
There should be no d i f f i c u l t y  i n  accep t ing  t h e  i dea  of an 
environment (bo th  e x t e r n a l ,  i n  t e r m s  of a i r ,  wa te r ,  food,  e t c . ,  
and i n t e r n a l ,  i n  terms of t h e  body and even t h e  b r a i n )  on which 
t h e  p l a y e r s  a c t ,  consuming s c a r c e  r e sou rces  and t ransforming ,  c r e a t i n g  
o r  des t roy ing  t h i s  environment. (Some f o u r  b i l l i o n  y e a r s  ago t h e  
photosynthes i s  of t h e  f i r s t  organisms transformed t h e  e x i s t i n g  
atmosphere of methane and ammonia t o  t h e  oxygenated one w e  know 
today -- t h i s  was probably t h e  f i r s t  example of p o l l u t i o n !  -- 
and s i n c e  then t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  t rans form t h e  environment has  been 
recognized a s  one of t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of l i v i n g  m a t t e r ) .  
There should a l s o  be no problem i n  accep t ing  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of 
c e r e b r a l  a c t i v i t y  which o p e r a t e s  t h e  i n t e r n a l  organs  of t h e  body 
and t h e  muscular a c t i v i t y  by which i n t e r a c t i o n  wi th  t h e  environ-  
ment i s  p o s s i b l e .  
The e x i s t e n c e  of conceptua l  c o n t r o l s  and t h e i r  use  i n  a  r e -  
cogn i t i on  mechanism a r e  more ques t ionab le  assumptions,  which w e  
s h a l l  a t t empt  t o  j u s t i f y  a t  s e v e r a l  l e v e l s .  
1 .  The ambiguous concept  of pe rcep t ion  inc ludes  both  an 
" o b j e c t i v e "  and a  " s u b j e c t i v e "  component. The o b j e c t i v e  component, 
which w e  c a l l  sensory pe rcep t ion ,  i s  provided by t h e  neuronal  c i r c u i t  
a c t i v a t e d  by t h e  sensory r e c e p t o r s .  But everyone knows t h a t  t h e r e  
i s  a l s o  a  s u b j e c t i v e  component by which t h i s  sensory pe rcep t ion  
is  i n t e r p r e t e d :  t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  may depend on many f a c t o r s  
(p rev ious  expe r i ences ,  emot ional  s t a t e ,  a t t e n t i o n  l e v e l ,  e t c . ) ,  
i . e . ,  on a  s t a t e  of c e r e b r a l  a c t i v i t y  independent of  t h e  sensory 
i n p u t s .  This  independent a c t i v i t y  r e p r e s e n t s  p a r t  of t h e  regula -  
t o r y  c o n t r o l  which w e  c a l l e d  conceptua l  c o n t r o l .  
2 .  I f  we a c c e p t  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of  an  endogenous c e r e b r a l  
a c t i v i t y  which " i n t e r p r e t s "  t h e  s e n s o r y  p e r c e p t i o n  of t h e  env i ron-  
ment,  w e  must p o s t u l a t e  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of  a r e c o g n i t i o n  mechanism 
which t e l l s  u s  whether  a  c o n c e p t u a l  c o n t r o l  and t h e  s e n s o r y  p e r -  
c e p t i o n  of t h e  envi ronment  and i t s  v a r i a t i o n s  a r e  c o n s i s t e n t .  I t  
seems t h a t  b r a i n s  have evolved sys tems which t r a n s f o r m  i n f o r m a t i o n  
on b o d i l y  needs  and env i ronmenta l  e v e n t s  i n t o  c e r e b r a l  a c t i v i t y  
p roduc ing  e i t h e r  p l e a s u r e  ( c o m f o r t )  o r  p a i n  ( d i s c o m f o r t ) .  These 
sys tems are known by p s y c h o l o g i s t s  a s  m o t i v a t i o n a l  sys tems ,  and 
a r e  n a t u r a l l y  more s o p h i s t i c a t e d  t h a n  s t r i c t l y  p l e a s u r e - s e e k i n g  
o r  pa in -avo id ing  sys tems .  They i n c l u d e  t h e  emot iona l  sys tem and 
t h e  homeos ta t i c  d r i v e  sys tems ,  which b a s i c a l l y  keep t h e  organism 
f u n c t i o n i n g  ( f o r  example,  t h e  hunger d r i v e ) .  These sys tems r e v e a l  
t h e  r e l a t i o n  between t h e  p e r c e p t i o n  of  t h e  envi ronment  and t h e  
c o n c e p t u a l  c o n t r o l s :  i f  t h e s e  a r e  n o t  c o n s i s t e n t  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  
can  be remedied by: 
( a )  a c t i n g  on t h e  envi ronment  ( f o r  example, by l o o k i n g  f o r  and 
consuming food i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  h u n g e r ) ;  
( b )  changing t h e  c o n c e p t u a l  c o n t r o l  when a c t i o n  on t h e  env i ron-  
ment c a n n o t  induce  a p e r c e p t i o n  of  t h e  envi ronment  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  
t h e  e x i s t i n g  c o n c e p t u a l  c o n t r o l .  
The l a t t e r  s t r a t e g y  (change of c o n c e p t u a l  c o n t r o l s )  a p p e a r s  t o  be  
less f r e q u e n t  t h a n  t h e  f i r s t  and,  f o r  many subsys tems ( such  a s  t h e  
h o m e o s t a t i c  s y s t e m s ) ,  i s  q u i t e  imposs ib le .  
3 .  The i d e a  of a  r e c o g n i t i o n  mechanism based on c o n c e p t u a l  
c o n t r o l s  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  concep t  of  e p i g e n e s i s .  The recog- 
n i t i o n  mechanism o u t l i n e d  above i s  b a s i c a l l y  a  s e l e c t i o n  mechanism 
w i t h  a  d e f i n i t e  Darwinian f l a v o r ,  choos ing  c o n c e p t u a l  c o n t r o l s  a s  
a  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  envi ronment  and changes  i n  t h e  envi ronment .  By 
r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  c e r e b r a l  a c t i v i t y  a s  t h e  f l u x  of  n e u r o t r a n s m i t t e r s  
i n  i n d i v i d u a l  synapses  ( s e e  b e l o w ) ,  one c o u l d  suppose t h a t  t h e  
s y n a p s e s  used  most f r e q u e n t l y  would be s t a b i l i z e d ,  w h i l e  t h o s e  used 
less f r e q u e n t l y  would d e t e r i o r a t e .  But t h e  mere d e s c r i p t i o n  of  
t h e  synapses  which a r e  s t a b i l i z e d  a f t e r  a  p e r i o d  of a c t i v i t y  i s  
c a p a b l e  of  e x p l a i n i n g  e p i g e n e s i s  o n l y  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  a  road  
network can determine the routes taken by cars - in this case 
existing travel patterns require the maintenance of commonly 
used routes while the others can be neglected. 
4. We also postulated that the evolution of the recognition 
mechanism is programmed genetically. This recognition mechanism 
is probably rather simple: it may just open or close (activate 
or deactivate) a number of neuronal circuits during one or several 
specified periods of time, allowing both the neurotransmitters 
released by the perception of the environment and the conceptual 
controls to pass through. 
It seems likely that some components of this mechanism 
(which should obey the laws of biochemistry) are periodic. These 
components are the many biological clocks involved in maintaining 
the homeostatic equilibrium of the organism. [It may be postu- 
lated that the recognition of the periodicity of the sun and the 
moon by periodic components of the recognition mechanism in com- 
bination with suitable conceptual controls leads to the concept 
of time.] These periodic components of the recognition mechanism 
probably lie at the heart of the ability to recognize regulari- 
ties and extrapolate them, as well as the desire to look for 
causal relations. 
Other components of this mechanism are not periodic, but 
are active only during a certain period. This may be illustrated 
by the phenomenon of "imprinting" in ethology: in animal species 
where the young are able to walk almost immediately after birth, 
the new-born animals follow the first moving object that they 
perceive, whatever this may be. (In practice, it is usually a 
parent.) However, this susceptibility does not last indefinitely. 
For example, ducklings can be imprinted only during the first 
twenty-four hours of their life, with sensitivity at a maximum 
between the 14th and 17th hours. The crucial factor in imprint- 
ing is the mobiZity of the object to be imprinted, and this 
reveals the importance of the perception of variations in the 
environment. 
5. The assumption of a recognition mechanism using conceptual 
controls allows us to explain the adaptability and redundancy of 
cerebral activities. A player can recognize the same sensory 
perception using different conceptual controls at different times 
-- this is redundancy. Then, thanks to the periodic nature of 
many components of cerebral activities, this sensory perception 
can be "interpreted" in several ways, provoking different actions 
(since we have assumed that the action taken depends upon the 
conceptual controls) - and this is adaptability. 
The components of the recognition mechanism based on one 
or a small number of conceptual controls operate the automatic 
biological systems (the automatic nervous system, etc.) , since 
in this case the subsystem inherits the genetic program of the 
component of the recognition mechanism. 
6. The concept of a recognition mechanism reflects the dich- 
otomy between "conceptually-driven processes" and "data-driven 
processes" introduced by specialists in cognitive psychology and 
pattern recognition. In this case the data-driven process is 
the cerebral activity provoked by the sensory perception of the 
environment while the conceptually-driven process takes the form 
of conceptual controls (this is the origin of our terminology). 
The idea of a recognition mechanism is also consistent with the 
concept of metaphor, regarded as a combination of a sensory 
perception of the environment and a conceptual control recognized 
by the recognition mechanism. A feeling of understanding, which 
amounts to a feeling of pleasure, occurs when a metaphor is re- 
cognized by the recognition process. Perhaps thought processes 
also fit into this representation, since they involve setting up 
conceptual controls in the form of assumptions and then comparing 
them with the perception of the environment. This dynamical 
process of making and matching seems to be quite universal. 
7. The proposed mathematical metaphor suggests the existence 
of a learning process described by a feedback relation which as- 
sociates a set of conceptual controls with each sensory-motor 
couple. The larger the set of conceptual controls, the less 
deterministic the learning process. This is consistent with 
several observed facts. For instance, studies of the imprinting 
phenomenon have shown that the greater the effort made by the 
young animal to follow the moving object, the stronger is the 
imprint. When one of the components of the sensory-motor couple 
is suppressed, the learning mechanism does not work normally. 
For instance, if kittens are raised in a visual environment com- 
posed of black and white vertical lines, they are unable to "see" 
horizontal stripes later in life. In another experiment, two 
kittens from the same litter spend several hours a day in a con- 
traption which allows one kitten fairly complete freedom to 
explore and perceive its environment while the other is suspended 
passively in a "gondola" whose motion is controlled by the first 
kitten. Both animals receive the same visual stimulation, but 
the active kitten learns to interpret these signals to give it 
an accurate picture of its environment while the passive kitten 
learns nothing and is, in practical terms, "blind" to the real 
world. 
Apparatus for equating motion and consequent visual feedback for an ac r i \ r : ,  
moving kitten (A)  and a passi\,ely moved one (PI (Held and Hein, 1963). 
DESCRIPTION OF THE MATHEMATICAL METAPHOR 
We represent the environment by a finite-dimensional vector 
space X. We emphasize the phenomenon of chemical communication 
in the description of cerebral activity, regarding hormones and 
neurotransmitters as chemical messengers released by endocrine 
glands or the axons of neurons and received by receptors in various 
organs or the dendrites of other neurons. 
At this level, the endocrine system and the nervous system 
may be distinguished by the mode of transport of the chemical 
messenger. This transport is slow and non-specific in the case 
of the endocrine system: hormones are carried by the blood; it 
is fast and specific in the case of the nervous system: neuro- 
transmitters have to cross a synapse (the place where the axon 
of a "presynaptic" neuron meets the dendrite of a "postsynaptic" 
one), which is only 0.02 p wide. When the pulse-coded informa- 
tion sent by the postsynaptic neuron reaches a certain threshold 
value, it releases neurotransmitters in the synapse, inducing 
an electrical response on the postsynaptic membrane after about 
1 o - ~  seconds. For simplicity, we shall neglect both the endo- 
crine system and the so-called electrical synapses. We then 
assume that t h e  s t a t e  o f  c e r e b r a l  a c t i v i t y  i s  d e s c r i b e d  by t h e  
e v o l u t i o n  o f  n e u r o t r a n s m i t t e r s  i n  each  s y n a p s e .  We denote by S 
the set of synapses (about one hundred thousand billion of them) 
and by Y := IR the finite-dimensional vector space of cerebral 
activity. The component ys of an element y := (yS) of this space 
denotes the number of neurotransmitter molecules passing through 
synapse s. 
We shall describe the temporal cerebral activity by several 
S functions of time into the space IR . The complex mechanism 
describing the processing of the presynaptic signals by each 
neuron will not be taken e x p l i c i t l y  into account. The usual 
description of the brain as a network is given in terms of the 
"trace" of the functions involved; a given synapse is "weighted" 
by the total number of neurotransmitters crossing it during each 
period. 
We distinguish two classes of temporal functions: 
1. The functions t+a(t) E.Y which describe the evolution of 
c e r e b r a l  mo tor  a c t i v i t y .  
2. The function t+c(t) E Y  which describes the endogenous 
evolution of the c o n c e p t u a l  c o n t r o l s .  
The cerebral activity induced by sensory perception of the en- 
vironment (both external and internal) is not included explicitly. 
The states of the systems are therefore sensory-motor couples 
(x,a) ranging over the vector space XxY; the controls of the 
system are elements c of Y. 
We represent the history of a trajectory t +  z(t) (a contin- 
uous function from [O,m[ to a finite-dimensional vector space Z )  
by the function T(t)-r from ]-.c,O] to Z, where 
T(t) Z(T) = z(t+~) for all T < 0 . 
- 
The derivative of a function z ( 0 )  : t + z (t) is denoted by z ' ( ) . 
The r e c o a n i t i o n  mechanism 
The recognition mechanism compares the perception of the 
history of the environment, the perception of its variation, and 
the state of the conceptual control at each instant. We shall 
describe it by a family of subsets R(t) .of the space Y x C(-a,O;Y)xX. 
There is recognition if, for all instants t, we have 
(c (t) ,T (t) x,x' (t) ) E R (t) . ( 1  
The e v o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t  
We assume that the evolution of the environment is governed 
by a differential inclusion with memory of the form 
where F is a set-valued map from IR+ x C(-~,O;X) x C(-~,O;Y) to X. 
The e v o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  c e r e b r a l  mo tor  a c t i v i t y  
The evolution of the cerebral motor activity is governed 
by a differential inclusion with memory, and is regulated by the 
conceptual controls: 
a' (t) E G (t,T (t) x,T (t) arc (t) ) I ( 3 )  
where G is a set-valued map from IR + x C (-al 0 ;X) x C (-al 0 ;Y) x Y to Y. 
The viabilitv condition 
The viability condition states that the player consumes 
scarce resources in order to be able to act on the environment. 
We translate this into mathematics by requiring that 
where K is a set-valued map from IR+ x X to Y. 
Note that the recognition mechanism is actually a differ- 
ential inclusion with memory, since the family of subsets R(t) 
can be regarded as the graph of a set-valued map R 
from IR+ x C (-a, 0;X) x Y to X . 
(We say that z belongs to R(t,P,c) if and only if (c, P,z) belongs 
to R(t1.1 Therefore, the evolutionary laws of the cognitive 
system of the player can be written as follows: 
We shall use the viability theorem for differential inclu- 
sions with memory (see Haddad 1981a). We shall assume that the 
set-valued maps F, R and G are bounded upper-semicontinuous maps 
with compact convex images and that the graph of the set-valued 
map K is closed. We adopt the concept of the contingent derivative 
of a set-valued map introduced in Aubin (1981), and consider 
the map L 
from IR+ x C(-m,O;X) x C(-m,O;Y) to Y 
defined by 
v(c,a) € C (-a, 0;X) x C (-a, O;Y) f 
T h i s  s e t - v a l u e d  map r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  l e a r n i n g  p r o c e s s  w e  ment ioned 
e a r l i e r .  W e  now s p e c i f y  t h e  i n i t i a l  c o n d i t i o n s :  t h e s e  a r e  t h e  
sensory-motor  c o u p l e s  ( e t a )  E C ( - a , O ; X )  x C ( - a , O ; Y )  s u c h  t h a t  
W e  r e q u i r e  t h a t  t h e  sensory-motor  c o u p l e  s a t i s f i e s  t h e  i n i t i a l  
c o n d i t i o n  
T ( O ) X = E ,  and T ( O ) a = c l  . (8) 
T h e  v i a b i l i t y  t h e o r e m  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  and s u f f i -  
c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a - s o l u t i o n  ( x ( * ) , a ( * ) , c ( * ) )  
o f  t h e  c o g n i t i v e  s y s t e m  ( I ) ,  ( 2 ) ,  ( 3 ) ,  ( 4 )  f o r  e v e r y  i n i t i a l  
s t a t e  ( 6 , a )  s a t i s f y i n g  ( 7 )  i s  t h a t  
I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  t h e  e v o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n c e p t u a l  c o n e r o l  i s  
r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  e v o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  s e n s o r y - m o t o r  c o u p l e  b y  t h e  
f e e d b a c k  law  
GAME THEORY AND VIABILITY THEORY 
T h i s  s e c t i o n  p r e s e n t s  a  s i m p l e  a n a l o g  o f  c l a s s i c a l  noncoop- 
e r a t i v e  game t h e o r y  i n  which p l a y e r s  a r e  r e p r e s e n t e d  by u t i l i t y  
f u n c t i o n s .  W e  c o n s i d e r  n  p l a y e r s ,  e a c h  p l a y e r  i b e i n g  d e s c r i b e d  
by a  c o g n i t i v e  sys t em d e f i n e d  by s e t - v a l u e d  maps (F i ,Gi ,R . ,Ki ) .  
1 
Assuming t h a t  t h e  o v e r a l l  a c t i o n  o f  t h e  n  p l a y e r s  on t h e  
env i ronment  i s  t h e  sum o f  t h e  a c t i o n s  o f  e a c h  p l a y e r ,  w e  f i n d  
t h a t  t h e  e v o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  env i ronment  and o f  t h e  c e r e b r a l  motor  
a c t i v i t y  o f  t h e  n  p l a y e r s  i s  governed  by a  d i f f e r e n t i a l  i n c l u s i o n  
w i t h  memory o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t y p e :  
(ii) ai(t) E Gi(t,T(t)x,T(t)ai,ci (t) ) (i= lr...r~) 
satisfying the viability conditions 
I 
Here again, most of the mechanisms for perception and communica- 
tion among the players are implicitly described in each cognitive 
system. For example, communication among players takes place 
via the state of the environment. If the structure of the en- 
vironment is very detailed it can reveal the existence of an 
explicit communication system among players. 
We can apply the viability theorem for differential inclu- 
sions with memory to this system: the result is a learning 
process L which associates the conceptual controls of each player 
at each time t with the evolutionary histories of the environment 
and the cerebral motor activities of the players. 
For this purpose we set 
The learning process L is described as follows: 
(cl ,.. . ,cn) belongs to L(t,S,al , .. . ,an) 
if and only if the intersection 
is nonempty. 
An open problem is the decentralization of this mechanism: 
under what conditions affecting the cognitive mechanisms and the 
structure of the environment can the map L be written 
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